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1. The political question doctrine and the United Nations  
 
The use of the political question doctrine (PQD), as a form of judi-
cial abdication, has long been asserted by domestic courts seeking to 
impose a bar on the merit of claims that challenge the validity, the legal-
ity, or the expediency of governmental acts involving highly political 
matters. Common issues considered immune from judicial inquiry and 
deferred for political consideration include military affairs and the con-
duct of foreign relations.1 Building on the assumption that political de-
bate, rather than judicial scrutiny, is more suitable for the review of sen-
sitive governmental acts, the judiciary in several municipal law systems 
adopts a prudent position of respect for substantive decisions taken by 
the executive branch, thus avoiding any interference with the latter. The 
PQD, albeit not uniformly applied, is in fact rooted in the (constitu-
tional) principle of the separation of powers, and therefore it is, essen-
tially, a State-related concept predominantly applied by domestic 
courts.2 
 
* Research Fellow of International Law, University of Milan. 
1 For a thorough review of the doctrine and practice of the use of the PQD in for-
eign policy-related matters see D Amoroso, ‘Judicial Abdication in Foreign Affairs and 
the Effectiveness of International Law’ (2015) 14 Chinese J Intl L 99; D Amoroso, ‘A 
Fresh Look at the Issue of Non-justiciability of Defence and Foreign Affairs’ (2010) 23 
Leiden J Intl L 933. 
2 With its several formulations, the PQD can be identified ‘as essentially a function 
of the separation of powers’ (L Henkin, ‘Is There a Political Question Doctrine’ (1976) 
85 Yale L J 597, 603, citing a passage from the landmark United States Supreme Court 
case in Baker v Carr, 269 US 186, 217 (1962)).  
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Yet, over the last few decades, both national and international 
courts have put forward arguments akin to the PQD in order to dismiss 
claims that challenged, directly or indirectly, acts attributable to the 
United Nations (UN). Variants of the PQD have been evoked by courts 
in order to justify refraining from reviewing Security Council resolu-
tions and the conduct of member States covered by them, on the basis 
that a judicial review would impinge on the Organization’s independ-
ence.3 For instance, judicial restraint has been embraced by (national 
and international) courts facing questions related to the implementation 
of Security Council resolutions imposing targeted sanctions.4 A similar 
deferential approach can be found in the well-known strand of deci-
sions rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),5 and 
by domestic courts,6 dealing with acts of States committed within the 
framework of military missions established by, or authorized by, the Se-
curity Council.  
Admittedly, the non-justiciability of claims against acts covered by 
Security Council resolutions has not always been explicitly grounded on 
the PQD. Rather different legal grounds have been relied upon, such as 
the lack of competence ratione personae of the international court, the 
jurisdictional immunity afforded to the UN, or the supremacy clause 
enshrined in Article 103. However, some jurisprudential lines may re-
veal the use of traditional arguments belonging to the PQD strain. 
Meaningful, in this regard, is the concern expressed by the ECtHR that 
judicial intervention in matters of international peace and security might 
affect, and interfere with, the ‘imperative mandate’ of the Security 
 
3 C Ferstman, International Organizations and the Fight for Accountability. The 
Remedies and the Reparations Gaps (OUP 2017) 135. 
4 See the well-known judgments before the Swiss Federal Court in Nada (14 No-
vember 2007) and Al-Dulimi (23 January 2008). The first episode of the so called ‘Kadi 
saga’ before the European Union courts is also a case in point (European Court of First 
Instance, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, 
case T-306/01, 21 September 2005), where the Council, the Commission, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom, expressly relied on the PQD to convince the Court to dismiss the claims. 
The argument, however, has not been followed by the General Advocate, nor by the 
ECJ which in 2008 reversed the first ruling.  
5 See eg Behrami and Behrami v France, Saramati v France, Germany and Norway 
App no 71412/01 and 78166/01 (2 May 2007); Beric and Others v Bosnia and Herze-
govina App no 36357/04 (16 October 2007). 
6 See eg UK House of Lords, Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence (12 Decem-
ber 2007). 
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Council under which the respondent State acted. In Behrami/Saramati 
and Beric and Others, for instance, the ECtHR, while dismissing the 
complaints for lack of competence ratione personae, affirmed the un-
willingness to interfere, through its judicial review, with the fulfilment 
of the UN’s key mission to secure international peace and security, and 
therefore to scrutinize any act or omission of Member States covered by 
it.7 This contention has also been evoked, by the same token, in Mothers 
of Srebrenica.8 Whether the approach endorsed by the ECtHR can be 
viewed as embracing a ‘restyle’ of the traditional PQD, it is not in doubt 
that the solution chosen underlies a judicial deference towards the su-
preme mandate of the political and ‘executive’ organ of the UN.9 From 
that perspective, the imperative nature of the mandate of the Security 
Council to ensure international peace and security is perceived, espe-
cially when involving military matters, as a political constraint on courts, 
even on international tribunals tasked with monitoring the respect of 
human rights. 
Intriguingly, the argument of the ‘non-justiciability’ of disputes that 
touch upon political and policy matters of the UN’s mandate has re-
cently resurfaced in a novel way. The ‘political argument’ has been 
raised to dismiss claims of compensation filed, before UN internal dis-
pute settlement mechanisms, by individuals whose rights have been af-
fected in the course of peacekeeping operations and territorial admin-
istration. Strikingly, the decision to consider the claims ‘not receivable’ 
due to having a ‘political nature’ has not been assumed by impartial 
courts or quasi-judicial bodies, but by…the UN Secretariat itself. The 
assessment unilaterally conducted by the UN Secretariat, leading to the 
‘non-justiciability’ of claims due to political reasons, raises a number of 
issues.  
 
7 In Behrami/Saramati and Beric and Others the disputes at stake called in question, 
indirectly, the resolutions of the Security Council concerning, respectively, the transi-
tional administration of Kosovo and the administration of Bosnia (Behrami (n 5) para 
149; Beric (n 5), para 29).  
8 ECtHR, Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and others v the Netherlands App no 
65542/12 (11 June 2013) para 154. 
9 According to some authors, the ‘deferential approach’ endorsed by the Court was 
instrumental in the granting of primacy to the substantive values of ensuring collective 
security (P De Sena, C Vitucci, ‘The European Courts and the Security Council: Be-
tween Dédoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of Values’ (2009) 20 Eur J Intl L 193, 
206). 
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The aim of this article is to evaluate the abdicative approach under-
taken by the UN and to frame it in the broader strategy of ‘politiciza-
tion’ of legal questions as a way of escaping responsibility and its finan-
cial implications. Firstly, the ‘political or policy-related’ disputes recent-
ly declared immune from UN internal review will be briefly outlined 
(para 2). The legal arguments in support of the ‘non-admissibility’ of 
such claims will be then critically discussed (para 3), in light of the 1946 
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (para 
3.1), and of the traditional formulation of the PQD (para 3.2). The arti-
cle takes a critical look at the wrong turn taken by the UN regarding the 
compensation of third-party claims, by attempting to disentangle the 
genuine reasons lying behind the new approach (para 4). Lastly, some 
final remarks will be made with regard to the quest for justice for (mass) 
tort claims against the UN (para 5).    
 
 
2. The non-justiciability of ‘political claims’ in the recent practice of the 
UN third-party disputes  
 
Whilst the deployment of pioneering technologies in UN peace-
keeping operations has already taken off, the mode of settlement of dis-
putes arising with third parties is still outdated and is arguably even 
moving backwards. Nothing meaningful has changed in the procedures 
for settlement of third-party claims since the entry into force of the 
1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
(CPIUN), requiring the UN, under the Section 29, to settle through 
‘appropriate modes […] disputes arising out of contracts or other dis-
putes of a private law character to which the Organization is a party’.10 
At the time of the establishment of the first peacekeeping mission 
(UNEF), a provision was included in the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA) signed in 1957 between the UN and the Egyptian Government 
to establish an arbitral body (the Claims Commission) mandated to re-
view and provide compensation in response to claims for damages oc-
curred during the course of the mission. The Model SOFA promulgat-
ed by the Secretary-General in 1990 contained a similar clause, which 
has been consistently reproduced in each of the SOFAs signed between 
 
10 CPIUN, Section 29; emphasis added. 
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the UN and the Host State following the mandate of a peacekeeping 
operations.11 With one member appointed by the Secretary-General, 
one by the host Government and a chairman appointed jointly, the 
Claims Commissions were supposed to work within a minimum set of 
judicial guarantees and to render final and binding awards.  
However, to date, Claims Commissions have never come into exist-
ence, and the provisions requiring their establishment remains a dead 
letter. Conversely, the practice of the UN has shifted towards the estab-
lishment of in situ administrative offices (the local claims review boards, 
hereinafter local boards), composed exclusively of UN staff and ac-
countable to the UN Secretary-General. Local boards do not have ad-
judicative powers, but they endeavour to negotiate an amicable settle-
ment with claimants.12 The rules applied (the ‘internal liability law’), 
and the cases dealt with, are still rather uncertain and remain undis-
closed,13 except for the crystal-clear financial and temporal limitations 
of the UN liability introduced by the General Assembly Resolution 
52/247 of 26 June 1998.14 Arguably, the UN system of third-party rem-
edies has taken a step backwards since the original ‘arbitral’ model de-
signed in 1957, at least from the perspective of the procedural guaran-
tees provided to claimants. It is in fact doubtful whether the local 
boards, with their inherent deficiencies, lacking independence and 
transparency, constrained by financial and temporal limitations, do 
provide an effective remedy for the victims.15  
Recently, a restrictive interpretation adopted by the UN concerning 
the ‘private nature’ of claims eligible for scrutiny pursuant to Section 29 
became an additional stumbling block for claimants seeking a remedy 
 
11 Section VII para 51 UN Doc A/45/594 (9 October 1990).  
12 K Schmalenbach, ‘Dispute settlement’ in J Klabbers, Å Wallendahl (eds), Re-
search Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Edward Elgar 2011) 251, 
265. 
13 See K Schmalenbach, ‘Third Party Liability of International Organizations. A 
Study on Claim Settlement in the Course of Military Operations and International Ad-
ministrations’ (2006) 10 YB Intl Peace Operations 33.  
14 UN Doc A/RES/52/247 (17 July 1998). These restrictions have already been put 
forward in several reports of the UN Secretary-General (UN Doc A/51/389 (20 Sep-
tember 1996) para 20 and A/51/903 (21 May 1997) para 10).  
15 On the shortcomings of the local boards and the detrimental effects of the limita-
tions introduced by the UN, which further curbed the possibility for the claimants to 
obtain full redress from injuries, see C Ferstman (n 3) 105-107. 
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and reparation for the harms suffered. In doing so, the UN tightened 
even further the already narrow access to justice for aggrieved individu-
als, thus setting a dangerous precedent that needs to be carefully scruti-
nized. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, such a restrictive and abdica-
tive approach has been adopted in two cases that spawned mass claims 
in tort. The complaints arose out of the outbreak of cholera in Haiti 
brought in 2010 by the MINUSTAH troops (hereinafter the cholera 
case), and of the lead poisoning at UN-run refugees’ camps in Kosovo 
which operated between 1999-2013 (the lead poisoning case). A high 
number of petitioners sought justice and individual compensation from 
the UN – respectively, 5000 Haitians affected by cholera and 138 mem-
bers of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities located in the In-
ternal Displaced Person’s (IDP) camps under the UNMIK management 
who suffered from lead poisoning. In both cases, while suits for damag-
es before national courts were in principle hindered due to the immuni-
ties afforded to the UN, the claims filed before the local boards were 
dismissed at the outset, being classified as ‘not receivable’ because of 
their public or policy law nature. More precisely, in the lead poisoning 
case, the UN rejected the claims of compensation for health damages 
filed before UN Third Party Claim Process in 2006, arguing that the 
disputes ‘do not constitute claims of a private law character and, in es-
sence, amount to a review of the performance of UNMIK’s mandate’.16 
As a consequence, the UN considered that it was not under any legal 
obligation to draw up a remedy for the victims within the meaning of 
Section 29 CPIUN. The UN further clarified its position stating that 
‘[t]he claims were considered by the Organization not to be of a private 
law character since they amounted to a review of the performance of 
UNMIK’s mandate as an interim administration, as UNMIK retained 
the discretion to determine the modalities for the implementation of its 
 
16 Letter from Patricia O’Brien (UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs) to 
Dianne Post, who represented the complainants (25 July 2011); emphasis added. By 
considering the claims ‘not-receivable’, the UN rejected the claims of compensation for 
health damages filed before UN Third Party Claim Process in 2006. However, ten years 
later, the Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP) acknowledged that the UNMIK had 
violated the rights to life and health of the claimants recommending that the UN apolo-
gize and pay individual compensation. See HRAP, N M and Others v UNMIK, case No 
26/08 (26 February 2016).  
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interim administration mandate, including the establishment of IDP 
camps’.17  
Likewise, in the cholera case a similar argument was made to im-
pede the review of the claims brought by the victims of cholera before 
the local dispute mechanism in Haiti. The UN Under-Secretary-General 
for Legal Affairs, in replying to a petition internally filed by victims of 
cholera, affirmed that ‘[w]ith respect to the claims submitted, consider-
ation of these claims would necessarily include a review of political and 
policy matters. Accordingly, these claims are not receivable pursuant to 
Section 29 of the CPIUN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 13 Febru-
ary 1946’.18 In a subsequent exchange of letters with the Human Rights 
Council Special Procedures mandate-holders, the UN further explained 
that ‘[i]n the practice of the Organization, disputes of a private law 
character have been understood to be disputes of the type that arise be-
tween two private parties’, such as those arising out of contractual lia-
bility, vehicle accidents and those relating to the use of property. It is 
contended that ‘in contrast to claims arising from circumstances in 
which the United Nations is acting like a private person, claims attack-
ing the political or policymaking functions of the Organization are not 
private-law in character. In this context, an assertation that the United 
Nations has not adopted or implemented certain policies or practices 







17 See Letter from Pedro Medrano, Assistant UN Secretary-General, Senior Coor-
dinator for Cholera Response, to Ms Farha et al (25 November 2014) para 93, in reply 
to the Joint Letter of Allegation from the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, the 
Independent Expert on Haiti, the Special Rapporteur on Health, and the Special Rap-
porteur on Water and Sanitation (25 September 2014). Coincidentally, this statement 
brings to mind similar wording used by the ECtHR in the Behrami and Mothers of Sre-
brenica cases (nn 7-8). 
18 Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Letter to Mr. Brian Concannon, Di-
rector, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (21 February 2013); emphasis add-
ed.  
19 See Letter from Pedro Medrano (n 17) para 87-89.  
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3. The political argument as a defense to liability  
   
By declaring ‘non-receivable’ the claims involving a review of politi-
cal and policy matters of the UN mandate, the Organization shielded 
itself from mass claims of litigation and, most importantly, from com-
pensation in the event of a finding of its liability. The result being that 
the UN enjoys a double immunity, before national courts and before its 
internal dispute settlement mechanisms – or even a triple one, given the 
lack of jurisdiction of international courts to rule on conduct attributa-
ble to the UN.  
The position maintained by the UN to avoid reviewing claims be-
fore its internal dispute settlement procedures is not legally sound nor 
fully convincing. This approach cannot be grounded on the provisions 
enshrined in the CPIUN and in the SOFAs, nor on the PQD’s argu-
ments used by domestic courts to prevent interference with executive 
actions taken in the international sphere. 
 
3.1.  The policy-related aggrievances and the divide between pri-
vate/public claims in the CPIUN  
 
According to the UN Secretariat, claims related to Haiti and Koso-
vo cases fall outside the scope of the obligation, enshrined in Section 29 
of the 1946 CPIUN, to provide for an alternative remedy, since the 
claims involve policy-related grievances and a review of the perfor-
mance of the UN mandate. A restrictive interpretation of the scope of 
the obligation set in Section 29 seems, on the surface, at odds with the 
rationale of the norm, ie the need to establish an appropriate alternative 
remedy that counterbalances the jurisdictional immunity afforded to the 
UN before national courts.20 Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this 
approach with ‘the aim of the UN Charter to promote freedom and jus-
tice for individuals’, in light of which the ICJ in 1954 argued that the 
 
20 The set-up of an alternative dispute mechanism is viewed as the ‘flipside and the 
necessary supplement’ to the UN’s immunity, K Schmalenbach, ‘Disputes Settlement 
(Article VIII Sections 29-30 General Conventions)’ in A Reinisch (ed), The Conventions 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies: A 
Commentary (OUP 2016) 529.  
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UN should afford judicial or arbitral remedy for disputes with its own 
staff.21  
Yet, the critical issue to be resolved is whether the disputes at stake 
have a private law nature, thus falling inside the scope of the obligation 
to provide for alternative dispute settlement. Admittedly, the archaic 
wording of Section 29, introducing the ‘private-law’ character limitation 
for claims eligible for internal scrutiny, is rather ambiguous. The dis-
tinction between private and public law disputes is controversial in do-
mestic legal orders and barely fits in the context of claims against the 
United Nations.22 The text of the CPIUN, on the other hand, does not 
contain a definition of ‘private law’ disputes that the UN is obliged to 
settle with appropriate modes, and its travaux préparatoires do not assist 
in clarifying the issue. Instead, the contextual history-drafting of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agen-
cies (CPISA), contemplating a regulation mirrored to the CPIUN’s one, 
offers a meaningful element to this debate. In commenting on Section 
31 CPISA, which is identical to Section 29 CPIUN, a line was drawn 
between private law disputes arising out of ‘matters incidental to the 
performance by the Agency of its main functions’, and those related to 
‘the actual performance of its constitutional functions’.23  
On the basis of this original distinction, one can argue that the mass 
claims in tort in Haiti and Kosovo cases should have been considered 
prima facie receivable, since they did not challenge the ‘constitutional’ 
activities of the UN or the performance of the functions of the 
MINUSTAH and UNMIK, relating instead to some ‘incidental’ as-
pects.24 In fact, the failure to exercise reasonable care to screen the UN 
 
21 ICJ, Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the U. N. Administrative Tribunal 
Advisory Opinion (13 July 1954) 47, 57. Although the ICJ held this argument in relation 
to the internal justice system for labour quarrels with the UN, there is no reason to ap-
ply a different rationale with regards to third-party disputes with the Organization. 
22 As noted by scholars, the private/public law divide ‘est historiquement et 
géographiquement construite et donc contingente, qu’elle rev revêt souvent un sens 
spécifique mais incertain au niveau international’ (F Mégret, ‘La responsabilité des Na-
tions Unies aux temps du cholera’ (2013) 46 Revue Belge de Droit International 161, 
167) and ‘[i]in relation to the United Nations, it is uncertain whether the distinction 
refers to the body of law, or to the nature of the complainant, conduct, or forum’ (D 
Hovell, ‘Due Process in the United Nations’ (2016) 110 AJIL 1, 34).   
23 See K Schmalenbach (n 20) 551-552.  
24 On the ‘incidental criterion’ see also Y Okada, ‘Interpretation of Article VIII, 
Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. Legal Basis 
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personnel prior to deployment, the failure to operate and maintain the 
sanitation facilities and waste disposal system in order to prevent the 
foreseeable transmission of human waste into waterways, and the failure 
to take adequate measures with regard to the hazardous health-
conditions of the areas where the refugee camps were located, call into 
question ancillary or instrumental activities rather than the core func-
tions of UN missions’ mandate.25  
The analysis of the subsequent (institutional) practice of the UN in 
the application of Section 29 can be read as backing this view. The Re-
port ‘Procedures in place for implementation of article VIII, section 29’ 
issued in 1995 by the Secretary-General helps greatly to clarify the 
problem, by identifying two categories of claims to which Section 29 is 
applicable: disputes arising out of commercial agreements (contracts 
and lease agreements), and other disputes of a private law character. 
Within the latter’s cluster of claims, the 1995 Report embraces ‘claims 
for compensation submitted by third parties for personal injury or 
death and/or property loss or damage incurred as a result of acts com-
mitted by members of a United Nations peace-keeping operation within 
the “mission area”’. 26 Accordingly, since 1998, claims for personal inju-
ry, illness or death arising from or directly attributable to the mission 
have consistently been included under the UN liability provisions con-
tained in every SOFA signed with the UN,27 with the principle of ‘oper-
ational necessity’ working as the only exemption from liability.28 Simi-
larly, the Legal Officer of the UN, while identifying the requirements 
that must be satisfied to trigger the applicability of Section 29, con-
firmed that the claim, to be receivable, must involve a legal relationship 
between the Organization and the claimant, based on contract or tor-
 
and Limits of a Human Rights-based Approach to the Haiti Cholera Case’ (2018) 15 
Intl Organizations L Rev 39, 67-68. 
25 Along this line, and with regard to Haiti claims, see F Mégret (n 22) 173. 
26 UN Doc A/C.5/49/65 (24 April 1995) para 15.  
27 See eg the SOFA signed between Haiti and the UN para 54. 
28 This principle exempts the Organization from providing compensation for dam-
ages occurring to private property, when ‘damage results from necessary actions taken 
by a peacekeeping force in the course of carrying out its operations in pursuance of its 
mandate’ (see UN Doc A/51/389 para 13).  
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tious liability (responsabilité aquilienne), and it must concern damages 
allegedly suffered during the course of that relationship.29  
Conversely, public disputes have been associated, in the practice of 
the UN, with claims challenging the validity and legality of decisions 
adopted by the General Assembly or Security Council.30 More broadly, 
claims have been characterized as ‘public’ when brought by States 
complaining about the defective performance of the UN functions, or 
invoking diplomatic protection on behalf of its mistreated citizens.31 
Likewise, disputes arising from the failure of the UN missions to pro-
tect civilians from the harmful acts of third parties might be included, 
under certain circumstances, within the same classification, since they 
would entail a revision of the truly operational functioning of the UN 
and its core mandate.32 These claims are considered by the UN to have 
an exclusively public (international) law nature. 
Yet, it is true that when civilians suffer injuries in the context of a 
peacekeeping mission, the private/public divide of the claim can be 
blurred. The same harmful act attributable to the UN can be assessed 
both as a tortious act on the basis of the relevant domestic tort law 
(amounting to a non-contractual liability of the UN) and as a human 
rights violation under public international law (triggering the interna-
tional responsibility of the Organization). In the UN practice, hybrid or 
mixed claims are considered receivable pursuant to Section 29, inas-
much as they can also be assessed through the lens of general principles 
of tort laws alone, without calling into question the performance of the 
UN mandate.33 The ‘private’ character cannot be excluded simply be-
cause the damages suffered by an individual are the result of a violation 
 
29 RH Harpignies, ‘Settlement of disputes of a private law character to which the 
UN is a party – A case in point: the arbitral award of 24 September 1969 in Re Starways 
LTD. v. the United Nations’ (1971) 7 Revue Belge de Droit International 451, 454. 
30 It is the position of the UN to not enter into litigation with claims that ‘consist of 
rambling statements denouncing the policies of the Organization and alleging that spe-
cific actions of the General Assembly or the Security Council have caused the claimant 
to sustain financial losses’ (UN Doc A/C.5/49/65 para 23).   
31 See Letter from Pedro Medrano (n 17) para 91. For instance, the unilateral re-
fusal to establish a claims commission upon the request of the Host State has been con-
sidered a public matter immune from internal scrutiny. 
32 Mass claims submitted by relatives of the victims of Rwanda and Srebrenica mas-
sacres have been designed so as not to have a ‘private law’ nature inasmuch as they chal-
lenge Security Council resolutions and the mission mandate (ibid para 91-92). 
33 On this point see K Schmalenbach (n 20) 553. 
34 QIL 68 (2020) 23-49		      						ZOOM IN 
 
of his/her rights under domestic law, also framed as a violation under 
public international law.34 In fact, the long-standing UN compensation 
practice encompasses the payment of damages for personal injuries aris-
ing from violations of international human rights law and humanitarian 
law.35 
Now, in light of the above institutional rules and practice relating to 
the UN’s liability, it can be maintained that claims arising from the 
cholera and lead poisoning cases are, at least predominantly, private in 
nature, and they are not exclusively of public character. In fact both 
disputes involve elements of a private law and tortious dispute: claim-
ants were individuals represented by NGOs (and not by their States of 
nationality), seeking monetary compensation for personal injuries or 
death, based on allegations of gross-negligence and recklessness, also 
grounded in domestic civil law.36 Moreover, in light of the purpose of 
Section 29 above stated, the ultimate test to appraise the ‘private’ char-
acter of a dispute is whether the claim can be theoretically brought be-
fore a national court which, only because of the immunity, would dis-
miss it.37 Should the claim be justiciable before domestic courts, it must 
be designated as a ‘private’ law dispute within the meaning of Section 
 
34 See Y Okada (n 24) 71. For an in-depth analysis of the nature of the international 
responsibility for human rights violation and the private/public divide see F Mégret (n 
22) 174-177; B Taxil, ‘Les réclamations de particuliers contre les operations de paix 
onusiennes: les défallances du système à la lumière de l’affaire du choléra’ (2017) 63 
Annuaire Français de Droit International 234, 244. 
35 See UN Doc A/51/389 (20 September 1996) para 6-8, 16.  
36 K Boon, ‘The United Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility 
in Good Samaritan’ (2016) 16 Chicago J Intl L 341, 361; C Ferstman (n 3) 114. The 
same view is shared in the Joint Letter of the Allegations (n 17) 4. See also the class ac-
tion introduced by cholera victims before the US courts, grounded on common law of 
torts (Class Action Complaint (9 October 2013) para 13), seeking liability under state 
laws and regulations, which prohibit, inter alia, disposal of human waste in waterways 
and negligence, including the negligent transmission of a contagious disease (para 53). 
Whilst the private claims in Haiti before the internal dispute settlements can be certain-
ly framed under the tortious law principles, the line between private and public charac-
ter in relation to the Kosovo case is much more blurred. Suffice to say that the claims 
were, firstly, classified as ‘private law’ and dismissed by the HRAP, and therefore fell 
under the jurisdiction of UNMIK Claims Review Board. Subsequently, after the claims 
were designated as of ‘public law’ nature by the UN Secretariat, the HRAP reopened 
the proceedings. On this point see also B Taxil (n 34); R Pavoni ‘Choleric notes on the 
Haiti Cholera Case’ (2015) 19 QIL-Questions Intl L 27-28. 
37 See F Mégret (n 22) 168. 
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29, thus triggering the obligation of the UN to provide an alternative 
settlement. In our view, since the claims did not challenge either the ex-
ecution of the core mandate, or an action taken by the UN questioning 
the wisdom of its choices, or reflecting a course of political decision 
(such as a military decision taken on the ground), but ancillary activi-
ties, both claims would be justiciable before national courts, provided 
that they are filed in accordance with the pertinent rules of private in-
ternational law, with the UN immunities being the only procedural bar.  
Lastly, the (international) ‘public’ function exercised by the UN 
while interfacing with the claimants cannot be considered a decisive el-
ement for designating the claim as ‘public’.38 Otherwise, all the (harm-
ful) interactions between the Organization and individuals occurring 
during the activities of the UN would be immune from scrutiny, except 
for those arising out of contractual liability. This would end up in align-
ing the ‘private/public’ divide of Section 29, which is legally relevant for 
the purpose of the obligation to settle the dispute under the CPIUN, 
with the acta iure privatorum/iure imperii distinction, applicable in the 
context of State immunities before domestic courts.39 In this regard, the 
recent statements of the UN-Secretariat, carving out the scope of appli-
cation of Section 29 only to ‘claims arising from circumstances in which 
the United Nations is acting like a private person’, thus removing tor-
tious acts from within the private law domain disputes,40 seems to dan-
gerously overlap the distinctions. 
 
 3.2. Refashioning the PQD within the UN legal order? The monop-
oly of the UN-Secretariat over the (re)interpretation of internal 
liability rules 
 
By asserting that claims involving a review of political and policy 
matters of the UN mandate are ‘non-receivable’, the UN adopted a line 
of reasoning which is hard to reconcile with the ‘private/public’ divide 
contained in the CPIUN and in the SOFAs, but it does resemble that of 
 
38 K Schmalenbach (n 20) 553. 
39 Moreover, the acta iure privatorum/iure imperii distinction has proved difficult to 
apply in practice and the 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and Their Property – albeit not yet in force – departs from this criterion, by 
providing a list of proceedings in which State immunity cannot be invoked. 
40 See Letter from Pedro Medrano (n 17) para 87. 
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the PQD used by domestic courts in relation to foreign acts of the ex-
ecutive. Much as certain acts of State escape judicial scrutiny, certain 
‘acts of the Organization’ are considered to be essentially immune from 
internal review. This results in a triple immunity for the UN before na-
tional, international and institutional fora. 
The use of the ‘political exception’, whose scope in domestic orders 
has been progressively downsized,41 is not suitable in the context of in-
ternational organizations, and particularly of the UN. An array of rea-
sons militates against the refashioning of the PQD model within the 
context of claims filed internally against the UN.  
First, both the disputes at stake do not involve truly ‘political’ ques-
tions within the traditional meaning of the PQD. In fact, as already stat-
ed, the claimants did not confront the political wisdom of choice made 
by the UN in performing activities under the mandate of the 
MINUSTAH and the UNMIK, nor the substantive political decisions 
thoughtfully adopted by UN organs or taken by member States on the 
ground, and strictly related to the performance of the missions. Neither 
the essential interests of the UN or its member States were at stake in 
the conduct under scrutiny. On the contrary, the disputes revolve 
around acts that are incidental to the performance of the functions en-
trusted to the two missions.42  
Second, the PQD has been developed as a State-related theory, 
strictly linked to the allocation of public powers, the preservation of in-
ter-institutional harmony, and to the constitutional system of checks 
and balances envisaged in municipal orders. Transferred into the insti-
tutional setting of the UN, the PQD would lose its raison d’être. The 
very fact that the legal assessment concerning the non-admissibility of 
 
41 The downsizing of the PQD is in line with the ongoing erosion of the traditional 
immunity from judicial control, as has long been contended by many constitutional and 
international scholars. As far as international Italian scholarship is concerned, the scope 
of application of the PQD has been challenged and critically discussed either in past 
works (see L Condorelli, ‘Acts of the Italian Government in International Matters Be-
fore Domestic Courts’ (1975) 2 Italian YB Intl L 178, and in more recent ones, see D 
Amoroso (n 1)). 
42 As above stated, Haitian victims contest the failure to screen the peacekeepers 
and the gross negligence in managing the raw sewage of the peacekeepers. Lead-
poisoning victims charged the UN for not providing them with timely information 
about the health risks of the IDP’s camps or the required medical treatment, as well as 
for failing to relocate them to a safer location.  
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‘political’ claims was conducted by the administrative branch of the Or-
ganization (the Secretariat), which is not independent of the ‘political’ 
power, does not square with the rationale of the PQD and its underly-
ing principle of institutional balance.43 The situation would have been 
different if the legal assessment concerning the ‘admissibility’ of claims 
were conducted by the Claims Commissions, that is to say by an arbitral 
dispute mechanism endowed with a minimum set guarantees of inde-
pendence and transparency.44 Third, while domestic judges expressly 
state the reasons for barring the consideration of the merits of a claim 
based on the PQD (or at the least they are required to do so), the prac-
tice of the Secretariat departed from this standard. The scarcity of rea-
sons in support of the declaration of ‘non-receivability’, coupled with 
the total inaccessibility of the previous cases assessed by the local 
boards, without a reasonable ground that justifies the confidentiality of 
the classified documents, makes the present situation different from the 
context where the PQD is traditionally applied by domestic courts.  
From a broader perspective, the way in which the UN raised the 
‘political argument’ is hardly consistent with the rule of law, a principle 
upon which the UN expressively claimed to be bound,45 as well as with 
very basic principles of accountability, good-governance, and transpar-
ency, which are maintained to be applicable also to international organ-
izations.46 In fact, the recent positions adopted by the Secretariat re-
 
43 As Ferstman puts, it is problematic when ‘the body taking the decision to rule 
out the category of claims is the would-be respondent’ (C Ferstman (n 3) 115). 
44 F Mégret (n 22) 166. The UN should firstly be obliged to establish the Claim 
Commission even if it is only to assess, according to the principle of ‘kompetenz kompe-
tenz’, whether claims are receivable under Section 29. However, the UN practice allows 
for the Secretariat to make a final assessment of the legal nature of claims, and ‘if no 
compelling reasons are provided against the ‘public international law’ assessment of the 
UN Secretary-General, a negative decision on jurisdiction is required’ (see K Schmalen-
bach (n 20) 555). 
45 With resolution 67/1, the General Assembly has clearly affirmed that the Organi-
zation ‘recognize[s] that the rule of law applies to all States equally, and to international 
organizations, including the United Nations and its principal organs, and that respect for 
and promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all of their activities and ac-
cord predictability and legitimacy to their actions’ (UN Doc A/RES/67/1 (24 September 
2012) para 2; emphasis added). 
46 In the 2004 Report on the Accountability of International Organisations, the In-
ternational Law Association (ILA) affirmed that ‘the principle of good governance re-
quires IO-s to consider the substance of a complainant with all necessary care and to 
give a reasoned reply’ (ILA Berlin Conference (2004), ‘Accountability of International 
38 QIL 68 (2020) 23-49		      						ZOOM IN 
 
moving (some) tortious acts from within the private law domain dis-
putes,47 in stark contrast with the UN’s consolidated practice and sever-
al pieces of internal UN law, are likely to clash with the principle of le-
gal certainty, since it attempts to reshape the applicable rules with re-
gard to pending claims. The adoption of statements by the Secretariat 
attempting to modify, ex post and in peius, the position of aggrieved in-
dividuals under the internal applicable rules of the Organization comes 
into tension with the principle of good faith and with the doctrine of le-
gitimate expectations,48 which provide for the predictability of the rules 
and conditions that a petitioner must comply with in order to file a 
claim before the internal dispute settlement procedures. This move is 
highly problematic in the context of the UN liability law, where the 
rules at stake have not been clearly codified, but have largely developed 
through internal practice, mostly undisclosed by the Organization. 
The recent change of policy raises concerns also from the point of 
view of the institutional balance of the Organization itself. Serious 
doubts surrounded the method through which the Secretariat attempt-
ed to unilaterally (re)define internal rules concerning the dispute of set-
tlements with third-parties (sharply defined also as ‘external administra-
tive rules’).49 If the UN wishes to review its compensation policy to-
wards third-parties, this should be based, from a procedural point of 
view, on a study conducted by the Secretary-General, possibly issued in 
an official and comprehensive Report, eventually endorsed by the Gen-
eral Assembly and enclosed in the SOFAs, which will take effect pro fu-
turo, and not with regard to pending claims. From a substantive per-
spective, the possibility to adopt special rules to regulate the conse-
quences of harmful acts is not boundless. Notwithstanding that the UN 
held a rather different view on the extent to which ‘special rules’ can 
 
Organisations’ (2004) 1 Intl Organizations L Rev 221, 270; emphasis added). Moreover, 
the Report clearly stated that ‘IO-s should render public the substantive outcome of 
remedial action against them by private claimants’ (ibid 265). 
47 See n 19. 
48 See K Boon (n 36) 361, and the ILA Report pointing out that the compliance 
with the principle of stating the reasons for a decision or a particular course of action ‘is 
in accordance with the requirement that IO-s should behave in a consistent manner, 
and may contribute to the creation of legitimate expectations’ (ILA Report (n 46) 238).  
49 K Schmalenbach (n 13) 43, borrowing the expression from C Amerasinghe, Prin-
ciples of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (CUP 1996) 194. 
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depart from the general international law on responsibility,50 these can-
not frustrate the purpose of Section 29 (to provide for an alternative 
remedy) and the general principle imposing an obligation to make repa-
ration.51  
Yet, the problem is that the definition and interpretation of internal 
rules, often grounded on the lex specialis principle, cannot be chal-
lenged before any fora. In this context, the Secretariat enjoys a full ‘mo-
nopoly’ over the (re)interpretation of institutional rules with knock on 
effects on individuals,52 thus contributing to the consolidation of certain 
legal contentions even when these are likely to collide with previous 
practice and the general international law on reparation. In other 
words, the risk is that ‘“fake” law progressively becomes “real”’.53 In the 
end, the fact that the UN Secretariat assumed the function of dispute 
settlement, in place of arbitral bodies, as well as the power to re-
determine ex post the admissibility criteria of claims, without clearly giv-
ing reasonable grounds, reinforces the perception of the UN as a Levia-
than institution unbound by law and even above the law. 
 
 
4. Behind the non-receivability of claims: Political questions or just bur-
densome questions?  
 
The wrong turn taken by the UN results in politicizing issues that 
are, in principle, assessable from a legal point of view. Yet, it is not dif-
 
50 While commenting on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (DARIO), the Organization claimed that ‘the obligation to make repara-
tion, as well as the scope of such reparation, must be subject, in the case of the UN, to 
the rules of the organization, and more particularly, to the lex specialis rule within the 
meaning of draft article 63’, such as the financial and temporal limitation introduced by 
the General Assembly in 1998 (UN Doc A/CN.4/637/Add.1 (17 February 2011) 30). 
However, the ILC clarifies that the special rules adopted by an international organiza-
tion can contract out general rules concerning responsibility only to a limited extent 
(Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations with commentaries 
(2011) vol II Part Two YB Intl L Commission 46, 54). 
51 On this point see recently C Ferstman, ‘Reparations for Mass Torts Involving the 
United Nations. Misguided Exceptionalism in Peacekeeping Operations’ (2019) 16 Intl 
Organizations L Rev 42, 44.  
52 As argued by C Ferstman (n 3) 126, the UN has a ‘monopoly over the law and its 
procedures’. 
53 C Ferstman (n 51) 46. 
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ficult to read, underlying the use of the ‘political argument’, the serious 
concern about the massive financial implications stemming from the 
admissibility of the (massive) claims. By dismissing the claims, the UN 
has dodged the merits of disputes which involve costly questions, rather 
than truly ‘political’ ones. Had the local boards declared ‘receivable’ the 
claims, the UN would have faced a significant financial burden, due to 
the large scale of claimants and the kind of damages suffered, thus set-
ting a dangerous precedent for future litigation.54 Considering that the 
estimated compensation for the victims far exceeds the average of the 
UN total annual budget, and that an ongoing cash shortage is plaguing 
the Organization,55 it is likely that the decision concerning the ‘admissi-
bility’ of the Haiti and Kosovo claims was taken under a great deal of 
(financial) pressure. At the same time, it comes as no surprise that 
member States have been reluctant to push for a different position,56 
since all the costs of UN liability are shouldered through member States 
contributions. For the same reasons, member States have not proved 
keen to trigger Section 30 of the CPIUN, which defers any differences 
with the Organization concerning the interpretation or application of 
the CPIUN, including the failure of the UN to comply with the obliga-
tion enshrined in Section 29, to the ICJ for an decisive-advisory opin-
ion.  
Facing this deadlock, the UN was able to pursue a rather abdicative 
approach, without encountering any significant objections from its 
 
54 While the plaintiff class action brought by the victims of cholera sought compen-
sation for US $ 2.2 billion (see Class Action Complaint (n 36) para 65), the UN are po-
tentially exposed to claims seeking compensation for between $15 and $35 billions of 
dollars (D Hovell (n 22) 42; M Garcin, ‘The Haitian Cholera Victims’ Complaints 
Against the United Nations’ (2015) 75 Heidelberg J Intl L 672, 699). With regard to 
Kosovo claims, the amount due to the victims is lower, considering the number of 
claimants (138), but according to the HRAP’s recommendation, adequate compensa-
tion encompasses both material and moral damages and the reimbursement of all fees 
and expenses incurred by the complainants in relation to the proceeding before the 
Panel (HRAP, N M and Others v UNMIK (n 16) para 349).  
55 In October 2019, the General-Secretary warned that the UN may not have 
enough funds for staff salaries, due to the delay in the contributions from States (see 
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1048782>).  
56 For the lack of significant reaction by member States in relation to the affaire 
cholera see M Buscemi, ‘La codificazione delle organizzazioni internazionali alla prova 
dei fatti. Il caso della diffusione del colera a Haiti’ (2017) 100 Rivista di diritto interna-
zionale 989, 1001-1010. 
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members.57 In fact, this approach can be viewed as part of a broader 
‘avoidance strategy’ developed by the UN when faced with highly oner-
ous tort cases, which is composed of three different but connected ac-
tions: (i) declaring the mass claims ‘not-receivable’ before the internal 
accountability mechanisms, by enjoying a monopoly over the 
(re)interpretation of institutional liability rules in the own interests of 
the Organization; (ii) apologizing officially for the role of the UN, often 
following the finding of internal inquiries, by adopting satisfactory 
measures that have no financial, but only ‘moral’ costs, if any;58 and (iii) 
eventually establishing voluntary Trust Funds for implementing com-
munity assistance projects for the victims, which receive donations from 
States and other donors, instead of inserting designated sums in the or-
dinary budgets of peacekeeping missions and territorial administrations. 
While the first two dynamics have also been followed in previous cases 
(namely, in the aftermath of the Rwanda and Srebrenica events), the es-
tablishment of voluntary funds by the Secretariat has occurred only re-
cently with regard to the cholera and lead-poisoning cases, and in sup-
port of the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping 
operations.59 Unsurprisingly, the Trust Funds have so far attracted only 
marginal voluntary contributions. While the Kosovo Fund has not been 
replenished yet,60 the Cholera Fund has committed the (limited) budget 
 
57 But see R Freedman, N Lemay-Hébert ‘The Security Council in Practice: Haiti, 
Cholera, and the Elected Members of the United Nations Security Council’ (2020) 33 
Leiden J Intl L 157. 
58 Statement of apologies expressed by the General Secretary in the Kosovo and Haiti 
case are available at <www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-05-26/ statement-
attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-human-rights> and at <www.un.org/press/en/ 
2016/sgsm18323.doc.htm>. Similar apologies have been offered also for the role of the 
UN in the Rwanda’s and Srebrenica’s tragic events, following the findings of internal in-
quiries. 
59 The UN established in 2016 the UN Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust 
Fund and the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, and 
in 2017 the Trust Fund in support of the Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma communities. 
60 Despite the efforts to mobilize resources to the Trust Fund, the financial situa-
tion is still critical (see UNMIK, Report of the Secretary-General UN Doc S/2019/797 
(4 October 2019) paras 26 and 54). However, the Under-Secretary General for Peace-
keeping Operations, in replying to the allegations raised by the Special Rapporteur on 
the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and dis-
posal of hazardous substances and wastes, mandated by the Human Rights Council 
(Letter 24 December 2018), affirmed that the UN will continue to direct available re-
sources to the affected communities through communities-focused projects funded 
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collected for community assistance projects,61 thus reinforcing the poli-
cy of the UN not to engage with individual compensation, but only with 
community-focused projects and humanitarian assistance.62  
Measures of ‘collective reparation’ and non-monetary remedies are 
not infrequent in the practice of mass violations committed by States, in 
relation to which the financial liability is often limited due to practical 
reasons.63 From this perspective, State practice has not always followed 
the rigid standard to provide for ‘full reparation’ historically set out in 
Factory at Chorzòw64 and enshrined in both the ILC works on interna-
tional responsibility with regard to the reparation owned to States, in-
ternational organizations or the international community as a whole. 
When it comes to the reparation of aggrieved individuals, the practice 
of the UN indicates a much further misalignment between how the ob-
ligation to provide reparation is framed in theory and how it is offered 
 
through sums inserted in the 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 budgets of the UNMIK. The 
resources are allocated for confidence-building projects and programmatic activities 
involving representatives of the affected communities, but not for individual compensa-
tion.  
61 See the webpage of the UN Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund 
(<http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CLH00>). To date, the resources amount to 
$10 million coming, mostly, from donations and the reallocation of the MINUSTAH 
unencumbered balance towards the Fund. The sum collected has been allocated to re-
cipient UN organizations (UN Funds and Programmes and UN Specialized Agencies), 
and implementing partners (Government and NGOs) with a view to implementing the 
new approach of the Secretary-General composed of two tracks – track 1 ‘Prevent and 
cut transmission’ (3 millions), and track 2 ‘development of a package of material assis-
tance and support for those most affected by cholera’ (6 millions). The latter of which 
includes the implementation of a symbolic community project in Mirebalais, the com-
mune where cholera started in Haiti, and community assistance projects in 4 cholera 
priority communes, both carried out in consultation with local affected communities, 
the UN organizations (namely, UNDP, UNOPS) and local authorities.   
62 In this regard, C Chinkin, ‘United Nations Accountability for Violations of In-
ternational Human Rights Law’ (2019) 395 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International 314 affirmed that ‘in both cases the core principles of human rights that 
[the United Nations] owed to all individuals appears to have become lost in some dilut-
ed concept of assistance to vulnerable communities’. 
63 C Tomuschat, ‘Reparation in Favour of Individual Victims of Gross Violations of 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’ in M Kohen (ed), Promoting Jus-
tice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Through International Law. Liber Amicor-
um Lucius Caflisch (Brill 2007) 569. 
64 Permanent Court of International Justice, Merits, PCIJ, 1928, Series A, No. 17, 
4, 21. 
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in practice, based on the availability of the resources of the Organiza-
tion.  
The wretched financial situation of the UN, given its dependence on 
Members’ contributions, and the lack of income streams, significantly 
impacts on the way the Organization recognizes its responsibility and 
conceives the rules governing the consequences of its conduct. In fact, it 
is precisely because of the scarcity of financial resources that the Organ-
ization introduced severe limitations, de iure and de facto, on third-party 
compensation, often disguised as lex specialis.65 For the same reason, the 
Organization is more inclined to offer reparation in the form of com-
munity-focused projects rather than individual compensation.66 In this 
regard, the ILC, while recognizing that that ‘[i]t may be difficult for an 
international organization to have all the necessary means for making 
the required reparation’, makes firmly clear that ‘inadequacy cannot ex-
empt a responsible organization from the legal consequences resulting 
from its responsibility under international law’.67  
Whether or not it is possible to reach an equilibrium in the tension 
between the theoretical principle of reparation and practical considera-
tions when it comes to the (mass) reparation of injured individuals, it 
remains that the reparation provided by the Organization, if not ‘full’, 
should at least take the form of ‘second-best measures’,68 that is to say 
measures sweeping out of the consequences of the wrongful acts to the 
greatest possible extent. Depending on the nature of the offences, non-
monetary forms of redress or collective forms of reparations (such as 
housing assistance, income-generating activities, education aid, and psy-
chological support), and means of satisfaction (eg disclosure of the 
truth, acknowledgement of wrongdoing and apology, memorialization), 
can effectively redress the prejudice suffered by the victims, without the 
payment of full individual compensation. In the aftermath of mass hu-
man rights violations, the importance of individual compensation in 
 
65 See amplius C Ferstman (n 51), arguing that the UN (mis)interpreted the extent 
to which special internal rules can derogate from general law concerning the reparation. 
66 See nn 58-59. See also the Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to 
Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Person-
nel, which ‘is not intended as a means for compensation’ (UN Doc A/RES/62/214 (21 
December 2007) Annex para 3). 
67 Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations (n 49) 77. 
68 C Ferstman (n 3) 92. 
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proportion to the suffered harm has in fact often been downsized and 
instead ‘the capacity of reparations programs to instill important values 
such as social solidarity, civic trust, and recognition’69 has been empha-
sized – a principle, that of local trust, which is central for every UN 
peacekeeping operation and territorial administration.  
To identify the feasible restorative measures able to redress – as far 
as possible – the prejudice suffered by the victims, having regard to the 
financial capacity of the UN, the Organization needs to enter into con-
sultation and negotiation with the victims, which should be conducted 
under an independent accountability procedure.70 In fact, when victims’ 
rights are not supported by their State of nationality,71 the Organization, 
by its own admission, will still have to face individual claimants.72 This 
necessarily requires the establishment of a tailored independent dispute 
resolution mechanism, which should exist alongside the local boards 
competent for everyday tortious acts (eg car accidents, property law 
disputes) and for claims of relatively low amounts that do not exceed 
the financial authority delegated to the administrative offices. The op-
tions for the establishment of an accountability mechanism have long 
been discussed by scholars, starting from the fact that the UN is unwill-
ing to move on from internal accountability schemes to judicial third-
party adjudication. The procedural alternatives thus far proposed in-
clude a Central Claims Commission,73 an Ombudsperson Institution,74 a 
 
69 D Hovell (n 22) 46. 
70 With regard to cholera victims, the UN is engaging in consultation with victims 
only partially and outside the framework of an independent settlement procedure (see n 
61). 
71 When faced with past multiple claims that entail multiple reparations, the UN 
agreed to negotiate a lump-sum agreement with the State of nationality of the victims, 
due to several practical advantages (see UN Doc A/51/389 para 35). 
72 idem para 37. 
73 N Schrijver, ‘Beyond Srebrenica and Haiti. Exploring Alternative Remedies 
against the United Nations’ (2013) 10 Intl Organizations L Rev 588, 596. 
74 N Schrijver (n 73) 596-597; M Garcin (n 54) 701. 
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Standing Inspection Panel,75 a Reparation Commission,76 and similar 
accountability mechanisms suggested in the 2004 ILA Report.77  
 
 
5. The quest for accountability for (mass) tort claims: What will moti-
vate the UN to enhance its internal accountability framework? 
 
The UN internal scheme of remedies available to aggrieved third 
parties is full of blackholes and inconsistencies. Paradoxically, a visitor 
who is injured at the UN headquarters,78 a person hit by an UN vehicle 
(…or unarmed drone),79 or a party who complaints about the breach of 
a contract by the Organization,80 would have more chance of having 
their claim settled with due process safeguards, as well as more chance 
to obtain compensation for the damages, than the most aggrieved vic-
tims of human rights abuse at the hands of peacekeepers.81 The UN’s 
failure to set up an independent and effective procedure for regulating 
 
75 See F Hoffmann, F Mégret, ‘Fostering human rights accountability: an ombud-
sperson for the United Nations?’ (2005) 11 Global Governance 43, suggesting the crea-
tion of an Ombudsperson already 15 years ago; M Garcin (n 54) 701. 
76 D Hovell (n 22) 45-46. 
77 ILA (n 46) 281-284. On the standards applicable to alternative means in the con-
text of UN peacekeeping operations see Y Okada (n 24) 64-66. Taking stocks of its ex-
perience, the HRAP spelled out minimum factors that should be taken into account to 
establish a future Human Rights Panel (The Human Rights Advisory Panel History and 
Legacy Kosovo, 2007-2016, Final Report (June 2016) 94-95). For further discussion of 
normative proposals see P Schmitt, Access to Justice and International Organizations. 
The Case of Individuals Victims of Human Rights (Edward Elgar 2017) 201-203. 
78 Tort disputes are reviewed by an internal Tort Claims Board, within the limits in-
troduced by the General Assembly (UN Doc A/RES/41/210 11 December 1986), and 
then submitted to arbitration if the dispute is not settled amicably. 
79 Accidents involving UN operated vehicles are usually covered by commercial in-
surance policy. For the compensation of damages arising from an (unarmed) drone 
crash operated by a private contractor see M Buscemi, ‘The Use of Unarmed Drones in 
UN Peacekeeping Operations. Issues of Attribution’ in E Carpanelli, N Lazzerini (eds), 
Use and Misuse of New Technologies: Contemporary Challenges Under International and 
European Law (Springer 2019) 257. 
80 ‘General conditions of contracts for the provision of goods and services’ para 17 
(available at <www.un.org/Depts/ptd/about-us/conditions-contract>). 
81 While the lead-poisoning victims have been heard before an independent ac-
countability mechanism (the HRAP), although its conclusions recommending compen-
sation have not been implemented yet, victims of cholera, instead, are still waiting to be 
heard before an independent body.  
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its authority over individuals is strikingly anachronistic and can be re-
garded as ‘an historical anomaly’,82 if compared with the experience of 
other national public authorities and international organizations faced 
with legal challenges from individual grievances. 
Against the broad consensus among scholars on the necessity to end 
UN impunity by strengthening its internal accountability framework, 
the difficult question is how to ensure that the UN actually does so. In 
other words, what factors can successfully motivate the UN to comply 
with the law? From the practice of the UN’s violations and the related 
extensive scholarly discussion, a few considerations seem to emerge 
about the incentives to comply with the obligation to provide for a rem-
edy and reparation. On the one hand, it is evident that primary rules of 
general international law relating to the obligation to provide a remedy, 
as well as the principles of ‘global administrative law’, have not effec-
tively succeeded in taming the UN – or not to the point of compelling 
the Organization to establish clear, adequate and effective procedures 
for the settlement of all the disputes with individuals injured by its ac-
tivities. Likewise, secondary rules of international law, codified in the 
DARIO, for implementing the responsibility have proved not to be very 
persuasive. The absence of significant reaction and protest either from 
member States, primarily concerned with financial repercussions, or 
from other actors of the international community, have deterred the 
UN from setting adequate, independent and effective dispute mecha-
nisms and from providing full reparation to aggrieved third parties.  
On the other hand, the threats to the independence and autonomy 
of the UN coming from several lawsuits lodged by individuals against 
member States and the UN, before national and international courts, 
have not turned into an overwhelming force leading to a substantial en-
hancement of the internal accountability framework. The possibility of 
passing the buck of responsibility to member States, by attributing 
wrongful acts to them, has exercised pressure on the UN to provide for 
certain internal accountability mechanisms only on few occasions.83 The 
same holds true for the challenges of class actions against the Organiza-
tion in front of national courts, whose judges have not brought into 
 
82 D Hovell (n 22) 4. 
83 The establishment of the Ombudsperson for Al-Qaida and ISIL Sanctions 
Committee might be viewed in this light. 
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question, thus far, the absolute immunity enjoyed by the UN in tort 
disputes. The combination of these factors produces a 22-catch situa-
tion where, in one respect, there is still uncertainty as the human rights 
standard in terms of remedies applicable to the UN, and in another re-
spect, these standards can hardly be enforced in any case due to three 
factors: (i) the absence of external monitoring mechanisms established 
by conventional law, (ii) the lack of a standing independent accountabil-
ity body set by institutional law, and (iii) the inefficiency of the en-
forcement tools posed by customary law of international responsibility. 
The result is that the UN is the sole guardian of its own duties and the 
applicable standards, being highly influenced by pressing financial con-
straints. 
Against this stalemate, scholars have recently emphasized how repu-
tation is increasingly becoming a constraint on abuses by international 
organizations, capable of forcing them to comply with accountability 
standards.84 This would replicate how it has been for (some) corpora-
tions progressively implementing human rights and environmental 
standards and recognizing their corporate social responsibility. In this 
regard, reputational sanctions have been viewed as a ‘disciplinarian of 
international organizations’85 and the key element for corrective and 
remedial actions. Historically, it is indeed true that accountability 
mechanisms established by international organization have come to 
light as a result of scandals, outcries and protests stemming from several 
actors of the international community.86 In the UN context, the two in-
dependent accountability mechanisms – the Ombudsperson for the Al-
Qaida and ISIL Sanctions Committee and HRAP – were both estab-
lished in the aftermath of criticism and pressure coming from different 
institutional actors – mostly European – and a group of member 
 
84 I Johnstone, ‘Do International Organizations Have Reputations?’ (2010) 7 Intl 
Organizations L Rev 235; K Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and the Responsibility of Interna-
tional Organizations’ (2015) 25 Eur J Intl L 991. 
85 K Daugirdas, ‘Reputation as Disciplinarian of International Organizations’ 
(2019) 113 AJIL 221 and the contributes hosted in the Symposium published in (2019) 
113 AJIL Unbound. 
86 P Klein, ‘Panels, Médiateurs et Mécanismes Informels de Contrôle des Activités 
des Organisations Internationales: Entre Accountability et Responsibility’ in J Craw-
ford, S Nouwen (eds), Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law 
(Hart 2010) 233. 
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States.87 Likewise, due process and fair trial guarantees have been 
strengthened in disputes with UN staff as a result of the 2009 reform 
which, as is known, was adopted in response to the severe criticisms 
towards the previous administrative jurisdictional system.88 Reputation 
is indeed a motivating factor that may lead the UN to adopt not only a 
higher level of protection toward third parties affected by its activities, 
but also a higher duty of care towards its personnel, especially those 
deployed in hazardous scenarios.89 After all, international organizations 
do have a reputation also as employers.90 
Today, the good or bad reputation the UN has is grounded even 
more on the opinion held not only by institutional actors, but also by 
‘private’ actors, including ‘civil society’. In the cholera and lead-
poisoning cases, the ensemble reaction emanating from journalists, aca-
demics, NGOs, and also institutional actors such as the UN independ-
ent experts (namely the UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures 
mandate-holders),91 and European institutions,92 have put pressure on 
 
87 As regards the HRAP, see eg Venice Commission, Opinion on human rights in 
Kosovo: possible establishment of review mechanisms, Opinion n 280/2004 (11 Octo-
ber 2004). The decision to establish an Ombudsman for the Al-Qaida and ISIL Sanc-
tion List has been prompted by the critics expressed, among others, by several Europe-
an actors (see eg Resolution of the Council of Europe, United Nations Security Council 
and European Union blacklists (23 January 2008) and the European judicial response to 
the sanctions, with particular regard to the Kadi saga before the ECJ); more recently see 
Proposal to the United Nations Security Council by the Group of Like-Minded States 
on targeted sanctions (12 November 2015) and Proposal by the Group of Like-Minded 
States on Targeted Sanctions for fair and clear procedures for a more effective UN sanc-
tions system (7 December 2018). 
88 For an overview of the criticisms see P Schmitt (n 77) 165. 
89 On this issue see the pivotal study conducted by A De Guttry, M Frulli, E Grep-
pi, C Macchi (eds), The Duty of Care of International Organizations Towards Their Civil-
ian Personnel. Legal Obligations and Implementation Challenges (TMC Asser Press 
2018), and especially G Armenes et al, ‘International Organizations and Alleged Duty 
of Care Breaches: A Growing Ethical, Reputational and Financial Challenge’ ibid 3, 13-
19. 
90 M Frulli, ‘Preface’ ibid. 
91 For the role of UN independent experts in the cholera case see P Alston, ‘Ex-
tracting Accountability: Special Rapporteurs and the United Nations’ Responsibility for 
Cholera in Haiti’, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 18-10 (20 Feb-
ruary 2018). For the role of UN independent experts in the lead-poisoning case see the 
exchange of letters between Baskut Tuncak, Special Rapporteur on the implications for 
human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous sub-
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the UN to – at the very least – apologize for its role and to implement 
community-focused projects in the most affected areas. However, the 
critical voices did not prompt a significant change to the point of laying 
down a fair and effective settlement procedure for the claimants, or of 
awarding the victims with individual compensation. The same holds 
true with respect to scandals and protests arising from sexual exploita-
tion and abuses committed in peacekeeping operations. One reason 
might be that the audience for whom the UN must consider its reputa-
tion is also composed of member States whose priority might be to re-
duce as much as possible their financial contributions to the Organiza-
tion.93  
Yet, the member States have a reputation too. To begin with, the 
way national delegates set policy priorities and mobilize financial re-
sources, and how they exercise their influence within an international 
organization in order to steer it towards certain goals. Indeed, the audi-
ence to which States are called to answer might be closer and more re-
active. Therefore, the light must also be necessarily turned on member 
States, which cannot hide behind the denial of justice faced by ag-
grieved individuals as a result of institutional structural deficiencies and 
misleading interpretation of liability rules by the Secretariat. Though 
damage to the reputation of the UN and its member States takes time, it 
has the potential to call into action every single actor.  
 
stances and wastes and the UN, available on the website of the UN Human Rights Of-
fice of the High Commissioner (<www.ohchr.org>). 
92 See the resolution of the European Parliament 2018/2149(INI) (29 November 
2018) para 43; and the letter signed by fifty-five members of the European Parliament 
who wrote to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres on January 31 2019 urging him 
to ‘take long overdue steps to ensure that the victims of widespread lead poisoning at 
UN-run camps in Kosovo receive individual compensation, adequate health care and 
educational support’ (the text is available at <https://feministinitiative.eu/assets/ up-
loads/2019/01/letter-to-mr-un-secretary-general.pdf>). 
93 On the multiple audience the UN has, see K Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and Ac-
countability Another Look at the United Nations’ Response to the Cholera Epidemic in 
Haiti’ (2019) 16 Intl Organizations L Rev 11, 22-23. On the contrary, when compensa-
tion is not at issue, damage to reputation proved to be effective in prompting for correc-
tive actions (see K Boon, ‘Reputation and the Accountability Gap, Symposium’ AJIL 
Unbound (n 85) 233). 
